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NO-FAULT INSURANCE: A STATUS REPORT
Robert E. Keeton*
Massachusetts led reform of the automobile accident reparations
system with its Personal Injury Protection Act enacted in August,
1970, effective January 1, 1971.1 This was the first state statute of
the type to which the term "no-fault" came to be applied during
the latter part of the 1960's. By the close of the 1971 legislative
sessions one more state (Florida) had enacted a statute of this
general type.2 In addition, five other states had enacted laws of a
different type that were nevertheless being called "no fault" laws
by some observers. These other states were Illinois,3 Delaware,4
Oregon,5 Minnesota,6 and South Dakota.7
During its 1971 session the Massachusetts legislature enacted
another innovative bill, expanding the scope of its no-fault law. The
original act applied only to bodily injuries. The 1971 enactment,
effective on January 1, 1972, extended the no-fault principle to
damage to vehicles as well, and it abolished negligence actions for
damage to all vehicles within the system.8 This extension was
prompted in part by the fact that actual experience during the first
year under the bodily injury no-fault law produced greater savings
in claim costs than even the boldest proponents of no-fault had
predicted.
The chart appearing with this article presents a brief comparison
of key features of the state laws that had been enacted by the close
of the 1971 legislative sessions. There are many more differences
among the laws than the chart shows, but perhaps it will serve to
highlight the most significant differences and to provide a frame-
work for further explanation of the key issues at stake.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University; Alumni Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota, 1971-72.
1 Mass. Laws ch. 670 (1970), as amended by Mass. Laws ch. 744 (1970);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A, 34D, 34M, 34N; ch. 175, § 22E-22H,
113B, 113C; ch. 231 § 6D (Supp. 1971).
2 Fla. Laws 71-252 (1971).
8 Ill. P.A. 77-1430 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
4 Del. Laws, H.B. 270 (Enacted May 27, 1971).
5 Ore. Laws, ch. 523 (1971).
6 Minn. Laws ch. 581 (1971).
7 S.D. CODE §§ 58-23-7, -8 (Supp. 1971).
8 Mass. Laws chs. 978, 1079 (1971).
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DEGREES OF COERCION TO OBTAIN INSURANCE
Every state in the United States has adopted legislation imposing
on motorists some degree of coercion to obtain motor vehicle liabil-
ity insurance. In most states the legislation is in the form of a
financial responsibility law requiring that insurance be obtained by
a motorist who has run afoul of the law-for example, by being
convicted of a serious driving offense or by having failed to offer
security for payment of any sums he may be found liable to pay
to a person injured as a result of his operation of his motor vehicle.
The intent of this kind of law is to encourage the purchase of
liability insurance by most drivers, but by the rather moderate
coercion incident to the threat of sanctions against those who, while
uninsured, happen to be involved in accidents or offenses.
A few states have adopted more stringently coercive measures.
Before 1971 there were three states with compulsory motor vehicle
liability insurance laws-Massachusetts (since 1927),9 New York
(since 1956)10 and North Carolina (since 1957)..l In 1971 Florida 12
and Delaware 13 joined this group, as well as providing for com-
pulsory no-fault coverage. Thus, there are now five states with
compulsory liability insurance and three (Massachusetts, Florida,
and Delaware) with an additional compulsory coverage paying
benefits without regard to fault.
A compulsory coverage, as that term is commonly used, is one
a motorist must have in order to operate his car legally. A manda-
tory coverage is one the insurer must include in every automobile
liability policy it writes in the state. Thus, in a non-compulsory
state a motorist may legally operate his car without having any
automobile insurance at all, but if he buys automobile liability
insurance, his policy must include any coverage that is mandatory.
Uninsured motorist coverage is mandatory in many states. And, as
the chart shows, coverage paying certain benefits without regard
to fault is now mandatory in Illinois and Oregon. Under the so-
called no-fault laws of Minnesota and South Dakota, there is no
compulsory and no mandatory coverage. Those laws merely require
that insurers offer to automobile liability policyholders an additional
coverage that pays specified benefits without regard to fault.
9 Mass. GEN. LAws ch. 90, § 34A (1971).
10 N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 220-279.1 to -279.39, 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1963).
11 N.Y. VsH. & TRAF. LAW § 310-21 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
12 Fla. Laws 71-252 (1971).
13 Del. LAws, H.B. 270 (Enacted May 27, 1971).
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TORT EXEMPTION
The term "no-fault" insurance was first applied to systems and
proposals with a tort exemption as well as provisions for no-fault
benefits. Such a system abolishes at least some of the tort actions
otherwise available to recover awards for pain and suffering. As
the chart indicates, the laws in Massachusetts and Florida are the
only ones having this feature of a tort exemption. Both these laws
have partial tort exemptions. That is, the exemption eliminates
some tort actions but preserves a substantial number of tort actions.
In contrast, the American Insurance Association, the New York In-
surance Department and Senator Jack Davies of Minnesota propose
virtually a total tort exemption; they propose to eliminate virtually
all tort actions for traffic injuries. In relation to this issue, the
Basic Protection Plan that Professor O'Connell and I have advanced
falls between the Massachusetts-Florida pattern on the one hand
and the AIA-New York-Davies pattern on the other hand. We
propose a partial tort exemption that would eliminate awards for
pain and suffering except in cases of severe injury. The Massachu-
setts and Florida laws allow awards for pain and suffering in more
cases since those acts permit awards in many cases of rather
moderate injury as well as cases of severe injury.
The most active supporters of no-fault insurance urge that the
tort exemption apply also to damage to vehicles. That is, they urge
that tort claims for damage to vehicles be eliminated except when
the claim involves a motorist "outside" the system (for example, a
motorist from a state not having similar no-fault law). Massachu-
setts omitted this principle from its first act but adopted it in 1971,
for application in 1972 and thereafter.14 Florida's act includes this
principle.15
LIMITS ON PAIN AND SUFFERING
RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSE
The Illinois act,' rather than eliminating some tort actions,
adopts a rule that in some cases limits awards for pain and suffering
to 50% of the first $500 of medical expense and 100% of additional
medical expense. This kind of law will reduce payouts for pain
and suffering in some cases, but it seems unlikely to reduce ad-
ministrative expenses since it does not eliminate any claims-even
very small ones. Some proponents of this kind of plan argue that
14 Mass. LAws chs. 978, 1079 (1971).
15 Fla. Laws 71-252 (1971).
16 lJ. P.A. 77-1430 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
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the number of claims will be reduced in fact because in many
instances the victim who has received no-fault benefits reimbursing
his actual losses will not bother to press his tort claim. Critics
(with whom I agree) respond that claims and costs are more likely
to go up than down because the no-fault benefits will place a "floor"
under the tort claim and make it more attractive both to the
claimant and to his lawyer. This risk is increased by the fact that
the Illinois act, as well as most other proposals of this type, allows
one to escape the limitation completely if he proves certain kinds of
injuries-for example, "permanent partial disability."
One of the three major industry groups-the National Associa-
tion of Independent Insurers-has thrown its support behind pro-
posals similar to the Illinois act. The American Mutual Insurance
Alliance supported this kind of legislation in the past, but currently
it is proposing a threshold bill, that is, a bill that in this respect is
like those of Massachusetts and Florida, requiring that plaintiff
prove that he has sustained a special kind of injury or more than
a specified amount of medical expense before he can recover general
damages (for "pain and suffering").
PLANS WITH NO LIMITS ON TORT ACTIONS
The Insurance Company of North America has developed and
is urging adoption of a plan that has neither a tort exemption nor
a limitation of pain-and-suffering awards to a percentage of medical
expense. The Delaware act 7 is patterned after this INA proposal.
The Oregon,' 8 Minnesota 9 and South Dakota20 laws are similar
to the Delaware law and the INA proposal in having no limitation
on tort awards for pain and suffering. But, as already noted, they
differ in another significant respect since the Delaware law, pat-
terned on the INA proposal, makes automobile insurance compul-
sory and these other three states have only financial responsibility
laws. Also, no-fault insurance is not even a "mandatory" coverage
in Minnesota and South Dakota.
DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE STATE LEGISLATURES
Two developments outside the state legislative arena deserve
special attention. One is the drafting of a proposed Uniform Motor
Vehicle Accident Reparations Act by a special Committee of the
17 Del. Laws, H.B. 270 (Enacted May 27, 1971).
18 Ore. Laws, ch. 523 (1971).
19 Minn. Laws ch. 581 (1971).
20 S.D. CODE §§ 58-23-7, -8 (1967).
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
United States Department of Transportation had a significant role
in the initiation of this project. At the moment, the work of the
special committee is unfinished, but it appears likely that it will
recommend to the National Conference a bill with a tort exemption
much stronger than those of the Massachusetts and Florida laws.
The other matter of special interest is the development of
increasing support for federal legislation. Indeed, at this moment
it seems likely that the field of choice among automobile accident
reparation systems will be occupied by Congress-and perhaps even
to the exclusion of the states-unless the states act decisively in
1972 with laws in a pattern that approaches uniformity among the
states and meets the criteria of sound no-fault legislation.
THE RATE IMPACT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT
Some opponents of no-fault insurance are currently spreading
the charge-usually by innuendo but sometimes directly-that the
Massachusetts no-fault law has caused automobile insurance rates
in Massachusetts to go up rather than down. What has happened
in fact is that the new law has caused greater savings to policy-
holders than even its proponents dared predict, while costs for those
forms of automobile insurance not changed by the no-fault law have
continued to rise dramatically.
The following table compares this assumed policyholder's actual
rates in 1971 and 1972 with what his rates were in 1970 under the
old system and with what his rates in 1971 and 1972 would have
been if the law had not been changed.
What 1971 what 1972
1970 Rates Would 1971 Rates Would 1972
Rates Have Been Rates Have Been Rates
$5,000 Bodily
Injury Liability
Ins. Only $100 $125 $132.50
$5,000 Bodily
Injury Liability
Ins. Plus $2,000
No-Fault Coverage $85 $61.54
$5,000 Bodily
Injury Liability
Ins. & Full
Deductible for
No-Fault Coverage $59.50 $43.08
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To illustrate what has happened, consider the case of a policy-
holder who in 1970 (the last year the old system was in effect)
paid $100 for compulsory coverage only. (You can get some idea
of where this assumed policyholder stands among Massachusetts
motorists from the following facts: In 1970 the statewide average
rate for compulsory coverage was about $70; the lowest rate in the
state was about $23; the highest (for an under-25 driver in Boston)
was $374.)
The following comments explain the figures in the table and add
some further information.
At the time of the legislative hearings in the summer of 1970,
bodily injury rates had been frozen for four years by law. Decisions
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts handed down later
in 1970 made it clear that the freeze could not be continued.21
Anticipating such a ruling, actuarial witnesses (including the state's
actuary) who appeared at the legislative hearings agreed that the
1971 rates would have to be at least 20% and probably 30% higher
than in 1970 if the legislature failed to pass the no-fault law. Thus,
the policyholder paying $100 for compulsory coverage in 1970 would
have paid $120 to $130 in 1971 if the law had not been changed.
The table above uses the figure $125, halfway between $120 and
$130.
Over the span of the last two decades, rates for compulsory
coverage in Massachusetts have risen at an average annual rate of
approximately 6%. Note that the estimated 25% increase in 1971
at the end of a four-year freeze is consistent with this trend. The
chart uses this 6% trend to show what 1972 rates would have been
if the law had not been changed.
One who elected a full deductible for himself and members of his
family (an option one should not take unless he has excellent col-
lateral sources of coverage for wage and medical losses), received
another 30% off the rate for his compulsory coverage. In our ex-
ample of the policyholder who paid $100 for compulsory coverage
in 1970, the rate for compulsory coverage in 1971 with no deductible
is 15% less, or $85, and 30% of this is a saving of another $25.50.
Thus, in 1971 he paid not $85 but $59.50 for his compulsory bodily
21 Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass.
1970); Boston Herald Traveler, Nov. 19, 1970, at 1, 10, reporting the
decision of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, from which
no appeal to the full bench was taken, declaring unconstitutional a
statutory mandate reducing rates for collision, comprehensive, fire, and
theft coverages. See also Insurance Rating Board v. Commissioner of
Ins., 268 N.E.2d 144 (Mass. 1971).
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injury coverage, compared with the $120 or $130 he would have been
paying that year. In short, his costs for compulsory bodily injury
coverage in 1971 were slightly less than half of what they would
have been.
The Commissioner of Insurance has ordered another 27.6% rate
reduction for 1972. Thus, in 1972 the assumed policyholder, if not
electing a deductible, will pay $61.54. This is a little less than half
of what he would have paid in 1972. If he elects the full deductible
he will pay $43.08 in 1972. This is a little less than one-third of
what he would have paid. That is, he saves over two-thirds on his
compulsory coverage.
Moreover, the actual experience under the no-fault law has been
better than even the most daring predictions. The Commissioner
has ordered companies to rebate another 27.6% for 1971 by allowing
an additional credit to that extent against 1972 rates. That order is
under attack in court, and the outcome is not yet known. The
additional savings that may result from rebates are not included
in the table. That is, the savings shown in the table are the mini-
mum savings policyholders will realize.
The Massachusetts no-fault act that went into effect January 1st
of 1971 made no change in any of the property damage coverages,
and the rates companies were allowed to charge for these coverages
in 1971 were based on projections from past experience under these
coverages. The increases were substantial (25% to 38% approxi-
mately), just as they would have been for bodily injury coverages
if the no-fault law had not passed. In most instances, the total
automobile insurance bill a Massachusetts policyholder paid in 1971
was larger than the bill he paid in 1970. That is, his savings on
bodily injury coverages were exceeded by the increases in costs of
his other coverages (collision, property damage liability and com-
prehensive). However, policyholders would have had increases in
the costs of all their coverages, and would have paid even more in
1971 than they did pay, if the no-fault law had not been passed.
In November, 1971 Massachusetts enacted a new law extending
the no-fault concept to property damage coverage, to be effective
on January 1, 1972, unless postponed because of the impact of the
national wage-price controls on insurance rates.22 It is expected
that this new law will effect savings on property damage coverages
for some policyholders, though probably not such dramatic savings
as in the bodily injury area.
22 Mass. Laws chs. 978, 1079 (1971).
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CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVE REFORM
I turn now to expressing some personal judgments. In my view,
the key to effective reform is twofold. First, the law must establish
automobile insurance on a basis such that you buy self-protection
on a no-fault basis instead of just buying "liability" insurance to
pay somebody else you injure. Second, the law must abolish "liabil-
ity" claims altogether unless injuries are serious.
Under a system with this key, two-fold feature, you would be
paid for your medical expenses and wage losses under the no-fault
self-protection insurance. And you could buy as much self protec-
tion as you wish, instead of being at the mercy of the other fellow's
low policy limit, as you are under "liability" insurance.
The so-called no-fault laws that have only one and not both of
the two key provisions are bad models to follow. Laws like those
in Illinois, Delaware, Oregon, Minnesota and South Dakota will
probably make matters worse rather than better.
The laws in those five states are being called no-fault laws by
people who are basically opposed to a real no-fault system and hope
to head it off by compromise. Those laws are corruptions of the
no-fault principle. They will just add more insurance costs to the
burden the public is already bearing. And they will not correct the
injustice of overcompensating for minor injuries while undercom-
pensating for serious injuries.
A real no-fault system gives better protection at lower cost.
Your medical expenses and wage losses are paid promptly under
your own self-protection coverage. And your insurance costs you
less because a real no-fault system reduces the overhead and cuts
out wasteful overpayment of trivial and trumped-up claims against
you.
Under the present system your insurance company usually set-
tles small claims made against you just to get rid of them. And as
a result you pay higher "liability" insurance premiums. Your com-
pany does this because under the "liability" system a claim of pain
and suffering has a substantial amount of nuisance value, on top
of any value it may have on the merits. The reason is that it
would cost the insurance company more than a thousand dollars to
fight the case through a jury trial and often more than two thousand
to fight it through an appeal. In practice, the insurance companies
find it less expensive to pay than to fight. And when the claimant's
out-of-pocket loss is less than $100 and he has an attorney, on the
average the companies pay more than seven times the out-of-pocket
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losses to settle. In contrast, the insurance companies find it worth-
while to fight in cases of serious injuries, and a claimant who has
out-of-pocket losses of $2500 or more has to be lucky just to get his
out-of-pocket loss paid.
Consider one of the most horrible of the horrible hypotheticals
opponents of no-fault insurance so often use, and see just how things
work out both under the present system and under a good no-fault
law.
Point One. If you have the misfortune to be severely injured
by an irresponsible driver-a drunk, a drug addict, or a fleeing thief,
for example-you will always receive at least as much under a good
no-fault law as you get under the "liability" system. And in many
cases you will get more. The reason is that your "liability" claim
for severe injury is preserved. In addition, you receive benefits from
your no-fault insurance, and this means you receive more than
under the present "liability" system in those cases in which the
irresponsible drunk had no insurance. In other words, the present
liability system leaves you at the mercy of the drunk's choice-not
yours-to drive with low limits or even with no insurance at all.
Point Two. If you have the misfortune to be hit by that irre-
sponsible drunk, you get nothing at all from your own "liability"
insurance coverage unless the drunk adds insult to injury by suing
you for his injuries. And even in that case all you get is protection
as to his claim against you. So if the drunk is really irresponsible
and has no insurance, you bear all your own losses yourself, unless
you have voluntarily, at additional cost, bought some separate
coverage for your own self-protection.
Point Three. A real no-fault law-one with the key two-fold
feature-makes substantial self-protection insurance part of the
basic package rather than an extra. Also, it still gives you all the
"liability" protection you had under the old system for claims made
against you by others. And by eliminating the wasteful and unfair
overpayment of small "liability" claims against you, through the
tort exemption, it gives you these greater benefits at lower cost
than you pay for "liability" insurance alone under the present
system.
If you want better protection against the risk of being severely
injured, and if you want that better protection at lower cost, what
you want is a real no-fault law.
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